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Abstract
Despite its high moral evaluation in both secular and religious 
worlds, philosophers have surprisingly paid relatively little attention to 
mercy. The discussion that has developed has produced an image of 
mercy that is to say the least, equivocal. Moreover, the contemporary 
discussion rests upon a number of problems that have a long and 
venerable philosophical pedigree. Unfortunately, these problems have 
neither been clearly identified nor the issues they raise clearly set out. 
Further, mercy has always been examined in relation to justice, in a broad 
re tr ibu tive  and deontological context. M ercy 's relationship to 
consequentialism and its moral standing have received next to no 
attention. The aim of this dissertation is, through an analysis of the 
concept and an examination of its relationship to other moral entities, to 
remedy these omissions.
In Chapter One I motivate the project. The problems are introduced 
and solutions offered by others are examined. As well, I set out the 
approach that will be followed in the remainder of the thesis.
Chapter Two consists of an extended analysis of the concept of 
mercy. I conclude that mercy is both a particular sort of action and a 
property of agents. As a property of agents, it is a sensitivity to the great 
need of another person that produces a responsive attitude of concern 
and care for their welfare. As an action, it is a response to the great need 
that another agent possesses. In both cases this arises from the perception 
of the beneficiary's powerlessness and vulnerability to the acts or 
omissions of the person holding the power. Thus, mercy rests upon a 
num ber of beliefs that agents have, as well as specific relationships 
between, and properties that, the actors within a merciful context possess. 
Finally, I distinguish mercy from some of its near relatives.
In Chapter Three I examine mercy's relationship to deontology, 
through an examination of three types of justice: retributive, comparative 
and consensual. I conclude that, although mercy is sometimes 
incompatible with some forms of justice, this poses neither conceptual 
nor moral problems. More importantly, I conclude that mercy is 
compatible with deontology.
Chapter Four is concerned with an examination of mercy's 
relationship to consequentialism. I conclude that mercy is compatible 
with consequentialism. If mercy is to achieve wide compatibility with this 
outlook, however, certain extensive modifications must be made to the 
traditional account of consequentialism, modifications so radical that 
many consequentialists would find them unacceptable.
C hapter Five contains an account of how deontology and 
consequentialism can accommodate mercy when it is supererogatory. As 
well, I examine the apparently incoherent claim that mercy is both 
required, as shown by the arguments in Chapters Three and Four, while 
also being in some (attenuated) sense supererogatory, a gift and optional. I 
conclude that, although mercy is often morally required, it is sometimes 
still supererogatory, a gift and morally optional.
In Chapter Six I move from the theoretical examination of mercy to 
an examination of it within a practical context. I examine mercy within its 
most typical practical context — the legal justice system. I recast the 
problems examined in Chapter Three within this practical context. I 
conclude that there are no barriers, in principle or in practice, to 
incorporating mercy into a practical context, of which the legal system is a 
paradigm example. Thus, it is a permissible act-option for, and property 
of, institutional agents. I also set out the notion of mercy within legal 
justice and explain how it is possible and justified.
With Chapter Six I conclude the negative case for mercy. The general 
conclusion of Chapters Three to Six is that mercy is a coherent concept 
and that the difficulties that have been traditionally raised against it can 
be overcome. Therefore mercy is capable of being part of our moral 
pantheon.
Chapter Seven contains the positive case for mercy. After examining 
some further problems I set out mercy's moral standing. I argue for its 
adoption and the cultivation of an attitude of mercy as a part of what it is 
to live a good life. I suggest that the moral standing of mercy rests upon 
the importance placed upon relationships between people and our 
valuation of traits of character, in particular those traits that dispose a 
person to care for and be concerned with the well-being of other people 
who are in need. As such, it is a disposition to be cultivated and an action 
to be practised in today's world.
vi
In Chapter Eight I explain briefly why the problems discussed in the 
foregoing chapters arise. Then I conclude the thesis with a short review of 
the country traversed in the preceding seven chapters.
Dedication
For
Jane, Elizabeth, and Isaac.
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Preface
I have undertaken, Nero Caesar, to write on the subject of mercy, in order 
to serve in a way the purpose of a minor, and thus reveal you to yourself 
as one destined to attain the greatest of all pleasures. For though the true 
profit of virtuous deeds lies in the doing, and there is no fitting reward 
apart from the virtues themselves, still it is a pleasure to subject a good 
conscience to a round of inspection...(Seneca, De Clementia, Bk.I.1.1)
Over the past quarter of a century the concept of mercy, its 
justification, the relationship between mercy and other moral concepts, as 
well as mercy's moral standing, has been the subject of an ongoing 
debate. A cursory glance at the literature, which consists of little more 
than two dozen articles, reveals a veritable confusion of images: some 
writers believe mercy to be basically supererogatory, optional,1 a gift2 or in 
some sense gratuitous, freely given, and a matter of grace.3 Others believe 
that mercy can be deserved, and when justified is in some sense 
required,4 or obligatory^ that it is closely related to, if not identical with 
some aspect of, justice;6 while others think that mercy is always 
unjustified.7 Some confine mercy to the realm of punishment, claiming 
that 'there is something odd and disturbing about being merciful to 
someone who has done nothing wrong'.** Others claim that mercy can be 
exercised in contexts other than purely punitive ones, such as to 'those 
who are powerless to help themselves' like 'the widow, the fatherless,
1. E.g., G.E.M. Anscombc, ‘Comment on , “Practical Reason and the Logic of Requirement”, by R. 
Chisholm’, in S. Komcr, (cd.), Practical Reason, Oxford, 1974, pp. 17-21 at p.21; J. Rawls, A 
Theory o f  Justice, Oxford, 1976, pp.109, 117; H.S. Hcstcvold, ‘Disjunctive Desert’, A P Q , 
(20:1983), pp.357-363, csp.357, and ‘Justicc to Mercy’ PPR, (46:1985;, pp.281 291, csp.281-282; J. 
Murphy, ‘Mercy and Legal Justice’ as Chapter 5 in J. Murphy and J. Hampton, M ercy and  
Forgiveness, Cambridge, 1988, p. 181.
2. E.g., Murphy, op. cit., pp. 166, 181.
3. E.g., H.R.T. Roberts, ‘Mercy’, P hilosophy, (46:1971), pp.352-353 at p.353; P. Twambley, 
‘Mercy and Forgiveness’, Analysis, (36:1975-1976), pp.84-90, at p.87.
4. E.g., A. Smart, ‘Mercy’, Philosophy, (43:1968), pp.345-359, at p.353; C. Card, ‘On Mcrcy’, PR, 
(81:1972), pp. 182-207, csp. 192.
5. E.g., J. Stcrba, ‘Can A Person Deserve Mercy?’ JSP, (9-10:1978-79), pp. 11-14, at p. 13.
6. E.g., Card, op. cit., p. 182; Hcstcvold (1983) op. cii., passim.
7. E.g., Roberts, op. cit., p.353.
8. E.g., Smart, op. cit., p.354.
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and the destitu te '.9 Some ally mercy with charity,10 others with 
benevolence, love or compassion,11 while others assume it to be some 
sort of morally valuable action, and an independent virtue.12
This diversity of opinion merely reflects the conflicting images and 
the diverse contexts of mercy that we discover when our pre-theoretical 
ideas are examined. For example, non-philosophers believe that mercy 
ought to be given and that it is a moral failing not to be merciful, such as 
in the case of a person convicted under a harsh and inflexible law, or who 
committed some crime in extreme circumstances. On other occasions, 
they believe quite the opposite: namely, that it is optional, supererogatory 
and a gift, such as when the winner of a hard fought duel declines to kill 
his adversary. Moreover, just about everyone, it seems, is in someone 
else's mercy: debtors are at the mercy of their bankers, offenders are at the 
mercy of judges, juries, Attorney's-General and Governors, and students 
at the mercy of their examiners. There are mercy flights to save a person's 
life and mercy killings to end a particularly miserable one. The 
vanquished are at the mercy of the victor, the yachtsman at the mercy of 
the sea, and the general public, if one believes the popular press, are at 
the mercy of greedy entrepreneurs and radical unionists. The list could go 
on.
Further, it seems that mercy sits awkwardly with important moral 
notions, such as justice, supererogation, desert and consequentialism. It 
appears to raise difficult questions about the consistency of our values and 
our capacity to be rational moral agents and compassionate ones as well. 
J.R. Lucas put some of the problems this way:
For the retributivist, mercy is logically possible but morally wrong. A 
man’s crime calls for a certain penalty: we may choose not to inflict it, but 
if so, we are failing to do what is required...For the utilitarian, mercy is 
not even logically possible except as a foolish failure to do what is best for 
the criminal and for society as a whole....If ever it could be right to let 
somebody off, then it is mandatory to do so and there is no argument for 
any heavier penalty at all.13
9. J. Kleinig, ‘Mcrcy and Justice’, Philosophy, (44:1969), pp.341-342, at p.341, and Punishment and 
D esert, The Hague, 1973, pp.87-88.
10. E.g., Card, op. cit., p. 198.
11. E.g., Kleinig (1969), op. cit. p.341; Murphy, op. cit., p. 166.
12. E.g., Murphy, loc. cit.
13. ‘Or Else’, in J Rachcls, (cd.), Moral Problems, New York, 1971, pp.222-237, at p.223.
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While James Sterba set two related but different problems out thus:
If we assume that a person can deserve mercy and that justice is giving 
people what they deserve then mercy would be required by justice. But 
then, what are we to make of the admonition to temper justice with mercy?
On the other hand, if mercy is not something that a person can deserve and 
men have no obligation or duty to show mercy then acts of mercy would at 
least be supererogatory. But then it would not be possible to condemn 
some one as merciless.14
Mercy has a central place in our culture. It is found centre stage in 
C h r is t ia n i ty ;15 the concept was examined by some of the earliest 
philosophers;16 it enjoys a long and an intimate association with secular 
institutions such as the law17 and the crown;18 it has long and venerable 
tradition in English literature.19 As well, mercy's paradigm contexts — 
justice and punishm ent — have suffered in recent years intense 
examination. It has (generally) a high moral evaluation amongst ordinary 
moral agents. Thus, while the quality of mercy may not be 'strained, its 
moral standing and nature are certainly elusive. It is surprising therefore, 
that mercy, compared to related notions in philosophy, has not been 
much examined,20 though the bonds between members of communities 
have increasingly been the object of attention.21
14. J. Sterba, op. cit., p . l l .
15. The Bible can be viewed as a chronicle extolling the virtue and practice of nicrcy. (Cf K.D. 
Moore, Pardons: Justice and Mercy and the Public Interest, New York, 1989, who makes a similar 
point.) God’s response to the fratricide Cain was that he should be banished and dwell in the land of 
Nod, (Gen. 4:16). Citations extolling mercy are numerous, of which this is typical: ‘...and what doth 
the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and »o walk humbly with thy God’, (Mic. 
6:8).
16. Eg., Seneca, De Clementia, op. cit.
17. V ide , 27 Hen.VIII. Cap.24 (1535): An Act Reconstituting Liberties in the Crown; F. Breslcr, 
Reprieve: A Study O f A System, London, 1965; C.H. Rolph, The Q ueen’s Pardon, London, 1978. 
For the existence of the prerogative of mercy in ancient times, see, G.R. Driver, and J.C. Miles, The 
Babylonian Laws, Oxford, 1955, Vol. I, pp.281-281 and 348-349; R.J. Bonner and G. Smith, The 
Administration o f  Justice from  llom er to Aristotle, New York, 1970, Vol. 2, pp.353ff. For a general 
history, vide, A. Brien, ‘Mercy: The History of an Idea’, unpublished paper, Division of Philosophy 
and Law, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, 1990.
18. The English monarch, swears in the coronation oath to ‘cause law and justice, in mercy, to be 
executed’ in all their judgements’. Blackstone, Commentaries, i.6.
19. Shakespeare, The Merchant o f  Venice, and other of his plays: predating Shakespeare is Piers 
Ploughman.
20. There arc two extended discussions that \ know of. The first is Seneca’s, Dc Clementia , op. cit. 
Although now little studied, De Clementia has at times been highly respected, and. a brief reading 
shows that this is rightly so. (For example, Calvin’s first work was an edition of He Clementia and 
the essay inspired Portia’s eloquent defence of mercy in the Merchant o f Venice.) Vide. Seneca: Letters 
From a Stoic, translated by Robin Campbell, Harmonsworth, 1985, pp.24-5. The second, Carla 
Johnson, Mercy: Its Nature and Moral Status, (Ph.D Thesis, University of Minnesota, 1988).
21. A few examples, vide, A.C. Baicr, ‘Trust and Antitrust’, Ethics, (96:1986), pp. 231-260; L.A. 
Blum, Friendship, Altruism , and M orality, London, 1980; R.S. Downie, ‘Forgiveness’, PQ,
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Even given mercy's high evaluation, it seems rarely practised and its 
exercise not actively encouraged. We are surrounded in our day to day life 
by a veritable orgy of revenge, vendetta, domination, violence and 
retribution. The streets of our towns and cities, and the belief systems of 
ordinary people and sadly, philosophers, are filled with these ideas. These 
practices are widely accepted, and the little humanity there is in our world 
is tempered by these feelings. Few wonder whether such ways of life are 
legitimate; indeed increasing numbers of philosophers argue that they 
can be defended.22 The temper of the times, socially and philosophically, 
is that retribution, and its near relatives are morally acceptable, and from 
the point of view of institutional theory, justified and necessary. An 
examination of mercy, and its relations, forgiveness, compromise, 
reconciliation and so on, is needed to present the other side of the story, 
the other moral option.
As Aristotle observed, in one of his most misunderstood remarks, 
'human beings are by nature political animals'.23 meaning only that they 
live in communities, in groups, and that they interact with each other. 
Understanding how they do interact, and more importantly, how they 
ought to interact, is the job of the social and political philosopher. We 
need not only to justify the institutions and ideas that influence our lives 
but understand as well, the ways in which they interact and fit together — 
if indeed they do — so as to allow each person to create, within known 
limits, their own version of the good life. This is all the more important 
given the enormous changes that have occurred and will continue to 
occur, in personal relationships, and indeed in the nature of the 
community itself, in advanced industrial societies. To put this bluntly,
(15:1965), pp.128-134; and Roles and Values, London, 1971; A. Oldcnquist, ‘Loyalties’, JP , 
(79:1982), pp.173-193; P. Pettit, ‘The Paradox of Loyalty’, APQ, (25:1988), pp.163-171; R. Brown, 
Analyzing Love, Cambridge, 1987.
22. E.g., A. Oldcnquist, ‘The Case for Revenge’, Public Interest, (82:1986), pp.72-80; J. Murphy, 
‘Hatred: A Qualified Defence’, as Chapter 3 in, Murphy and Hampton, op. cit., pp.88-110. A policy 
o f grounding the criminal law on retributive justice and just deserts has been explicitly proposed in 
Commonwealth jurisdictions. V ide, Law Reform Commission -  Australia, Report No. 44, 
Sentencing, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1988, §26-§29. In the United 
States this trend is even more marked -  especially in regard to Capital Punishment. Leigh Dingcrson, 
Director, National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, remarked that, ‘Deterrence was the 
argument [for the death pcnaltyl in the early 1980’s. Now that argument has been refuted by any 
number of studies, and what remains in this country is a sense that “they deserve it.” Retribution is 
the argument of the nineties.’ ‘Playing for Time’, Mark MacNamara, Vanity Fair, November 1990, 
p.88.
23. Politics, 1.2.9, (1253a).
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no one can doubt the importance of the role of benevolence, care, 
solicitude, and love in human life, but there has been remarkably little 
attention paid to them, compared to other notions in social, political and 
moral philosophy. Therefore, an examination of mercy is indicated so as 
to redress some part of this neglect.
It has not always been the case that philosophy has neglected mercy 
or its near relatives. In fact, worries about mercy have a long and 
distinguished pedigree. Aristotle, perhaps, had in mind a worry when, in 
a well known section of the Nicomachean Ethics, he gives an account of 
how the departure from a rule, justified within a system of justice, can 
itself be justified24 — a problem that is found frequently in the 
contemporary discussion of mercy. Seneca, writing c. A.D. 55, in De 
C lem entia  was concerned with analyzing legal mercy, justifying it, 
distinguishing it from pardon and pity and recommending it to an 
absolute ruler — the Roman Emperor Nero. Moreover, Seneca's essay 
was clearly part of a Stoic tradition that examined notions similar and 
related to mercy. For example, Chrysippus wrote a book entitled 
Concerning Acts of Kindness and his predecessor, Cleanthes, wrote a 
treatise on the same subject.25 Thus, interest in these sorts of actions can 
be traced almost to the very beginning of philosophy. Closer to our own 
times, Saint Anselm examined the apparent incoherence of ascribing 
Divine mercy and Divine punishment and justice to God.26
This dissertation is an attempt to remedy the deficiencies in the 
discussion. I aim to discern some order in this welter of phenomena that 
surrounds mercy. I shall set out an account of mercy, its moral standing 
and role in the moral life a virtuous person, as well as our social 
institutions. Along the way we will examine, sometimes all too briefly, 
some of the most topical problems in moral philosophy: the importance 
of the virtues, feminist moral theory, the role of universalism, 
impartiality, supererogation, the idea that there could be a limit to the
24. Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 1137b 5-30.
25. SVF. 2.1082 and 1.579, 1.580. Cf. M.E. Rccsor, The Political Theory o f  the Old and Middle 
Stoa , New York, 1951, pp.21-22. Seneca’s De Clementia also falls within that genre conccmcd with 
giving advice to absolute monarches, peri basileias, in much the same way as Machiavclli’s The 
Prince  a millennium later. Cf. M.T. Griffin, Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics, Oxford, 1976, 
pp.148-149.
26. St Anselm, Proslogion, Chapters 9 - 1 1 ,  The Prayers and Meditations o f St Anselm, (translated 
by Sister Bcncdicta Ward), Harmondsworth, 1979, pp. 249-253.
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actions we can be enjoined to perform, and the idea that sometimes less 
than the best can be morally good enough.
I do not pretend that I have told the whole story, or even a large part 
of it, or written the last word. The aim was rather more modest: to define 
the problems and suggest some answers.
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